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The business of bribery: Globalization, economic liberalization,
and the “problem” of corruption
JAMES W. WILLIAMS & MARGARET E. BEARE
Department of Sociology, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3J IP3
(email: jamwil@yorku.ca)
Abstract. This paper is intended as a critical response to the emerging consensus within both
academic and policy literatures that we are currently facing an epidemic of corruption which
threatens to undermine the stability of economic and political development on both a national
and global scale, and which requires both immediate and wide-ranging policy interventions.
Based on a review of the publications and policy statements of the leading anti-corruption
crusaders – namely the OECD, the IMF, and the World Bank – it will be argued that the recent
concern with corruption is attributable, not to any substantive increase in corrupt practices, but
rather, to the re-framing of corruption in light of broader shifts and transformations within the
global economy.

Introduction

While available evidence suggests that corruption is an enduring and
relatively constant feature of world political systems,1 the past decade has
been witness to a noticeable shift in the treatment of the phenomenon on
both academic and policy fronts. Specifically, corruption has emerged
within the context of international policy debates as a serious social
problem requiring integrated anti-corruption efforts on a global scale.
With this international attention, what has historically been defined as a
domestic issue, and subsequently, a cost of doing business with a select
group of developing nations, has re-emerged as a global political concern.
This qualitative shift is captured by Glynn, Kobrin, and Naim (1997) who
note that, “Campaigns against corruption are hardly new. But this decade is
the first to witness the emergence of corruption as a truly global political
issue eliciting a global political response
. . . The 1990s, we would predict, are unlikely to pass without the achievement
of significant legal and institutional anti-corruption reforms” (Glynn, Kobrin

and Naim, 1997: 7).
To a large extent, this prediction has been borne out in practice as a number
of international economic and development organizations have responded to
this perceived “crisis” of corruption through a myriad of research initiatives,
policy statements, and legislative reforms. These include the following:

• Proposed legislative and policy reforms submitted by agencies such as
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), and the Organization for American States (OAS).
These have largely taken the form of anti-bribery conventions
prohibiting the practice of bribery by member nations. The recently
approved OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is perhaps one of the
strongest statements of this position.
• Anti-corruption initiatives and stricter lending policies2 on the part of
international banking organizations such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). These have been articulated
according to a common, and coordinated strategy to enhance
organizational surveillance and governance over the disbursement of
funds to client countries (World Bank, 1997d; IMF, 1997).
• The formation of non-governmental organizations such as Transparency
International (TI) whose primary mandate is the development and
implementation of anti-corruption strategies on a worldwide basis.
• An amassing of research evidence on the part of both academics and
policy makers linking corruption to poor economic growth and low
political stability to which democratization, liberalization, and
privatization are offered as the preferred policy responses (Doig, 1998;
Elliott, 1997; Glynn, Kobrin and Naim, 1997; Ades and Di Tella, 1996;
Hariss-White and White, 1996; World Bank, 1997a; IMF, 1997).

Despite variations in their mandates and strategies, these efforts have
coalesced into a fairly unitary and cohesive discourse on corruption. This
discourse consists of four dominant attributes:
1. a conviction that corruption has increased to epidemic levels, and that
globalization has provided much of the impetus and opportunity for this
growth;
2. a high degree of consensus as to the nature, type, and cause of the
global “corruption crisis” with corruption defined almost exclusively in
terms of bribery3 and attributed to non-democratic and highly
centralized political and economic systems;
3. a preoccupation with the effects of corruption on foreign investment, and
only a secondary focus on its impacts within developing countries; and
4. “outsider” and top-down policy responses, such as democratization,
privatization, free market liberalization, and various forms of
institutional and macroeconomic reform which tend to target the
“demand” rather than “supply” side of the corruption equation.

Two crucial observations follow from this discourse and its underlying
foundations. First, despite the appearance of an array of separate voices all
reaching the same conclusion(s), closer inspection of the corruption
“debate” reveals a clear overlapping of positions and interests. With
most of the research on the topic being sponsored and conducted by
members of the major economic and development agencies – i.e. the IMF,
the World Bank, and the OECD – there has been a strong convergence
between academic, public policy, and corporate perspectives.4 This has
contributed to a singular and highly politicized account of corruption, its
underlying causes, and the necessary policy responses.
Secondly, these positions and interests have been articulated according

to a primarily economic discourse which attributes the deleterious effects
of corruption on domestic economic growth and development to its status
as a source of uncertainty in economic exchanges, and thus, a barrier and
disincentive to foreign investment (Glynn, Kobrin and Naim, 1997; LeVine,
1989; Rodrick and Rauch, 1997; Elliott, 1997). Undoubtedly, much of this
effect stems not only from the existence of corruption as a variable cost,5
but also from its association with non-democratic and non-competitive
market structures which are indicative of both restrictions on foreign trade
and investment, and a lack of transparency and accountability in financial
transactions. What is of particular interest here are the implicit links
between this status of corruption as a form of economic risk and
uncertainty, and the more general international policy debates surrounding
globalization. These debates feature the professed need for improvements to
both the accessibility of global capital to foreign markets, and the stability
and manageability of these markets as they become increasingly global,
and thus, unpredictable in nature. The preeminence of economic
liberalization and democratization as the preferred policy responses to
corruption are particularly telling here given their consistency with the
more general interests of foreign investors in greater market penetration and
transparency.
The appreciation of this wider political and economic context is critical
to understanding the perceived “crisis of corruption” as it suggests that the
status of corruption as a social problem is founded upon general and profound
anxieties concerning the nature, direction, and management of the emerging
framework of economic globalization, rather than more narrow concerns with
national economic development and political stability. The implication here
is that the key change that has occurred over the past ten years is not the
growth of overall levels of corruption or the severity of its effects on domestic

economic growth as the anti-corruption crusaders claim, but rather, the
reframing of corruption as a source of economic risk and uncertainty that
must necessarily be problematized according to the objectives and interests
of the global economy. Thus, the epidemic of corruption is more perceived
than real, and this perception is conditioned by a broader set of economic
and political interests. It is important to note that, in adopting such a
position, this paper is not refuting the existence of corruption, nor its status
as a problem deserving of concerted national and international attention;
rather, its intention is to provide a context for both the recent emergence of
corruption as an object of international concern, and the particular manner
in which this “problem” has been defined. Thus, our objective is to provide
a critical counterpoint to the corruption discourse that has dominated both
policy and academic literatures to date.
These links between the discourse of corruption and the wider context of
economic and political globalization will be articulated through three main
sections. The first will consist of a general analysis of the international
reaction to corruption, and its homogeneity with respect to the causes,
effects, and policy implications of corrupt practices. The second section will
contextualize this discourse by tracing its relationship to the wider
framework of globalization. Specifically, it will be revealed that the very
same organizations that have emerged as critical players in the anticorruption crusade are also key proponents of economic globalization in
general, and the strategies of capital mobilization and market governance
in particular. In drawing together these two, apparently distinct and
disparate, discourses of corruption and economic globalization, the third
section will reveal that corruption has emerged as a social problem to the
extent that it constitutes a potential barrier to the effective implementation of
these global economic strategies – this due to its status as a form of

economic risk and uncertainty in a market driven by both predictability
and unfettered access. The paper will then conclude with a brief reflection
on the implications of this discussion for the nature of control and order
within the emerging global system and, in particular, the growing
involvement of non-state institutions and agencies in producing and
perpetuating a social order based on an explicitly economic and actuarial
logic.

1. The international reaction to corruption

When viewed from within the context of the studies, reports, and policy
statements issued by the key players in global economic and political policy,
including the Organization for Economic Development (OECD), the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization of American
States (OAS), and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), what is
clear is the belief that general levels of corruption have increased dramatically
in recent years and are continuing to rise.6 Two specific aspects of this growth
have been identified as warranting particular concern. First, there is the
growing concentration of corruption in developing countries with fragile or
underdeveloped democratic institutions and capitalist market structures
(Klitgaard, 1988). In this context, corruption is seen as a serious threat to
the objectives of political and economic stability within a liberaldemocratic model (Klitgaard, 1988; Meny, 1996). A recent press release
from the non-government organization Transparency International serves as
a strong testimonial to this concern, “... the impact of bribery on peoples
lives and on democracy is greatest in the poorest countries and those in
transition to free market systems. Here the bribery is like a wrecking ball,
destroying good government, a free press and an independent Judiciary.

Not to mention the destruction of basic health and education services”
(Transparency International, 1997: 3).
The second cause for concern is the contribution of globalization to the
perceived seriousness of the corruption problem. Globalization, it is argued,
has both increased the opportunities for corrupt practices and made
detection more difficult due to the proliferation of electronic commerce
and offshore financial centres (Elliott, 1997; Leiken, 1997; OECD, 1996).
This link between the context of globalization and qualitative shifts in the
nature and incidence of corruption is directly captured by an OECD policy
report which states, “The expansion and globalization of the world
economy have given the problem a fresh dimension. The deregulation of
financial markets, the virtual elimination of exchange controls, the spread
of new information technology and the development of ever more
sophisticated systems of payment are making it increasingly complicated to
detect and punish corrupt practices” (OECD, 1996: 9). A similar sentiment is
shared by Leiken (1997) who notes that, “... a revolution in public opinion is
transforming [the corruption] issue. The hardships of global competition
have

exhausted

voters’

patience

with

government excesses and

misconduct” (Leiken, 1997: 55). Ultimately, these two dimensions of the
corruption debate are highly instructive as they suggest that the emergence
of corruption as a social problem is not merely a case of reported or
perceived increases in the frequency of corrupt practices, but rather, that it
is a product of a specific social and economic context – that of
globalization – according to which previously acceptable practices have been
re-defined as objects of international concern and attention. It is this context
which is key to understanding the nature and significance of the discourse on
corruption.
Underlying these general statements concerning its growth as a global

issue, there are two specific effects of corruption which are seen to warrant its
status as a serious social problem. The first is primarily economic in nature
and relates to the deleterious effects of corrupt practices on economic growth
and the efficient distribution of economic resources (Doig, 1998; Bray, 1998;
Sutton, 1997; Almond and Syfert, 1997; Elliott, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1997;
Mauro, 1997, 1998; Murphy, 1995; Klitgaard, 1988; World Bank, 1997a;
World Bank, 1997b; Gray and Kaufmann, 1998; Kaufmann, 1997; OECD,
1996; IMF, 1997). Empirical evidence for this is provided by a number of
studies which have found corruption to be negatively correlated with both
investment and growth (World Bank, 1997b).7 This economic perspective is
clearly assumed by a 1997 World Bank report which argues that,
Global concerns about corruption have intensified in recent years. There
is increasing evidence that corruption undermines development. It also
hampers the effectiveness with which domestic savings and external
aid are used in many developing countries, and this in turn threatens
to undermine grassroots support for foreign assistance. Corruption is of
growing concern to donors, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens
in developing and industrial countries alike.

(World Bank, 1997a: 2)

This leads the authors of the report to conclude that, “The international
community simply must deal with the cancer of corruption, because it is a
major barrier to sustainable and equitable development” (World Bank,
1997a: 2).
The second deleterious effect involves the role of corruption in
undermining the legitimacy of both local and national governments (Doig,
1998; Sutton, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Murphy, 1995; Klitgaard, 1988;
World Bank, 1997b; Gray and Kaufmann, 1998; OECD, 1996).
According to a recent World Bank Report, “Corruption violates the

public trust and corrodes social capital, and it can have far-reaching
externalities. Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor
infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy to the point where even
honest officials and members of the public see little point in playing by
the rules” (World Bank, 1997b: 2). This is seen to have serious
implications for the political viability and stability of developing nations
in particular. In combination, these effects of corruption on economic
development and political legitimacy are deemed to be problematic to the
extent that they undermine the principles of what has been termed “good
governance,”
The damaging effect of corrupt practices on good governance is well
known and applies to all countries. It subverts the governmental
decisionmaking process, distorts development inducing inappropriate
expenditures and waste of needed resources and undermines the
legitimacy of governments. Whatever the economic and political
situation of a country, the impact of corruption can be very serious.
Policies of good governance which create a favourable environment
for the corruption-free implementation of public policy need to be
vigorously promoted.
(OECD, 1996: 5)

This international perspective on corruption and its effects is telling in
a number of respects. First, the entire notion that corruption constitutes a
threat to national economic development is couched in the assumption that
foreign investment is essential to domestic growth. Thus, the central threat
is not to the allocation of domestic resources, but to the effective, efficient,
and accountable capitalization of foreign investment. Secondly, an explicit
connection is made between national development, political stability, and the
processes of democratization and liberalization. Here any domestic

conception of development is overlooked in favour of policies which are
manifestly Western in nature and design, and thus, feature the expansion of
democratic political and economic structures as the key to prosperity within
the developing world – not to mention the greater penetration of foreign
investment into new markets. It is these very processes and institutional
structures which are assumed by the term “good governance,” and in
relation to which corruption is defined as a serious economic and political
threat.
The extent to which the international corruption discourse is embedded
within the political and economic objectives of Western nations is even more
clearly revealed in discussions of the proposed causes of corruption and their
perceived implications for foreign policy. In terms of the former,
corruption is largely attributed by OECD, World Bank, and IMF reports
to the “overdevelopment” of the state in developing countries, and hence,
the existence of monopolistic and non-competitive market conditions (World
Bank, 1997a; World Bank, 1997b; Mauro, 1998; Gray and Kaufmann, 1998;
OECD, 1996). When coupled with a lack of transparency in the political
process, this socio-economic context is understood to create widespread
opportunities for corruption through both the production of economic rents,
and the establishment of institutional arrangements which provide
government agents with a high degree of autonomy, and subsequently, an
absence of accountability for their daily activities. The importance of
economic rents for corruption is clearly stated by Mauro (1998) who
argues that, “A key principle is that corruption can occur where rents exist
– typically, as a result of government regulation – and public officials have
discretion in allocating them. The classic example of a government
restriction resulting in rents and rent-seeking behaviour is that of an
import quota and the associated licenses that civil servants give to those

entrepreneurs willing to pay bribes” (Mauro, 1998: 1).8 These factors,
combined with the low pay accorded government officials in many
developing nations, are believed to provide ideal conditions for corrupt
practices through which political status is translated into economic wealth.
For the most part, this etiology is re-iterated by the academic literature which
similarly identifies the size of the state, the existence of non-competitive
market conditions, and a lack of transparency and accountability in the
political process as key factors in the onset and proliferation of corrupt
practices (Goudie and Stasavage, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Elliott, 1997;
Ades and DiTella, 1996; Haniss-White and White, 1996).
In light of this understanding of the etiology of corruption, the most
frequent solution proposed by both researchers and policy makers is the
expansion of the processes of democratization and economic liberalization
which, it is argued, will contribute to a reduction in the size of government,
eliminate

non-competitive market conditions, and introduce greater

visibility and accountability into government practices (Elliott, 1997; Glynn,
Kobri and Naim, 1997; Ades and Di Tella, 1996; Hariss-White and White,
1996; World Bank, 1997a; World Bank, 1997b; Gray and Kaufmann,
1998; Kaufmann, 1997; Leiken, 1997; OECD, 1996). Through the removal
of conditions which generate opportunities and create value for corrupt
practices, and which provide government officials with the autonomy and
low visibility through which they may execute these exchanges, the
presumed result will be a significant decrease in overall levels of
corruption. This policy stance is most clearly articulated by Hariss-White
and White (1996) who note that, “The policy implications of these analyses
are that corruption can be reduced by rolling back the state through
privatization and deregulation and by introducing more competition,
transparency, and accountability into the political process through a

transition to a democratic regime” (Hariss-White and White, 1996: 2). The
implication here is that, “In the long run, since competitive constraints will
destroy the basis of rent-seeking and democratic institutions will create the
political constraints necessary to enforce accountability, corruption will
wither away” (Hariss-White and White, 1996: 4). The importance of
economic competitiveness is also a key element of the World Bank’s anticorruption efforts, “Any reform that increases the competitiveness of the
economy will reduce incentives for corrupt behaviour. Thus policies that
lower controls on foreign trade, remove entry barriers to private industry,
and privatize state firms in a way that ensures competition will all
support the fight” (World Bank, 1997b: 3). Ultimately, it is a very specific,
Western-based understanding of market discipline which underlies the bulk
of the proposed reforms. This perspective is most clearly revealed in the
comments of Robert Leiken (1997) on the benefits of privatization,
“Privatization subjects erstwhile state resources to the discipline of the
market and the oversight of investors. Exposing the public sector to
internal, domestic, and international competition

breaks up state

monopolies. The freeing of exchange rates, the reduction of import and
export tariffs, and the ending of price controls strip senior officials of the
power to determine, for a ‘fee,’ the market price of many commodities”
(Leiken, 1997: 68).
Overall, the policy reports issued by the major international aid and
economic organizations all reiterate a series of widely agreed upon
causes of corruption and its impending policy implications. Paulo Mauro, a
researcher and policy analyst for the IMF, makes reference to this developing
consensus, “We have a reasonable theoretical understanding of the causes
and consequences of corruption, and have begun to get a sense of the
extent of these relationships through empirical research. A consensus is

emerging that corruption is a serious problem, and several bodies in the
international arena have begun to take policy measures to curb it” (Mauro,
1998: 6). Within this framework, corruption is attributed to authoritative
regimes who, through the size and breadth of the state apparatus, are able to
create non-competitive economic and political markets which both generate
economic rents, and provide government officials with a high degree of
status, power, and autonomy. With corrupt practices linked to reductions in
national economic efficiency, the destabilization of international trade and
capital flows, and the undermining of the legitimacy of newly emergent
democratic institutions, the proposed policy response typically includes
broad policies of privatization, liberalization, and democratization to be
complemented by more specific strategies such as increases in pay for
government officials, the drafting of stricter legislative guidelines and
administrative policies, and the general facilitation of greater transparency
and accountability in government proceedings. These accounts of the
causes, effects, and appropriate responses to corruption are strikingly
consistent with the political objectives and foreign policies of Western
nations, a link which provides a broader, and potentially more instructive,
context from which the perceived “problem” of corruption may be viewed
and contemplated.
At this point, based on the preceding review of both policy and academic
literatures, we wish to highlight four weaknesses in the dominant
international perspective on corruption. First, what is clear in many of these
analyses is the disconnectedness of the concept of corruption from the social,
political, and economic contexts and conditions of nation states and local
communities. Disclaiming statements aside, “corruption” is most often
treated within this discourse as a phenomenon which is uniform in nature
and effect, and which may be understood independently of variations in

national contexts and societal conditions. However, corruption is not only
de-contextualized within these accounts, it is also defined in extremely
narrow terms – most commonly as the acceptance of bribes and kickbacks
by foreign government officials. Such a perspective is problematic to the
extent that it neglects other forms of corrupt behaviour, belies the inherent
variability in definitions of corruption (Johnston, 1996; Gibbons, 1989;
Gardiner, 1993) across different nations and cultures, and systematically
overlooks the complicit role played by international trading “partners” –
such as corporations who initiate bribes and international banks who
facilitate the rapid flight of capital from less developed countries
(Hampton, 1996).
A second weakness is the prevalence of an exclusively economic paradigm.
This relates to the fact that, despite general and well-intentioned disclaimers
as to the complex and manifold determinants and implications of corrupt
practices, corruption is viewed by the international community in explicitly
economic terms with little concern for its broader social and political
implications. Furthermore, this economic framework is articulated in direct
reference to the self-interested Western objectives of democratization and
liberalization of world trade and investment. Within this context, corruption
is largely viewed as a market distortion, and thus, a source of risk and
uncertainty to foreign investors, rather than an obstacle to economic
growth for developing nations. The predominance of this global economic
perspective is made explicit within an OECD report in which it is stated
that, “Recognizing that corruption is a many-faceted problem, we were well
aware that by reviewing it solely from the standpoint of international trade
we would touch upon only one of its dimensions” (OECD, 1996: 10). Any
lingering uncertainties as to the economic pragmatism underlying the
discourse of corruption are dispelled by Almond and Syfert’s assertion that,

“Ultimately, corruption will be contained because, quite simply, it is bad for
business” (Almond and Syfert, 1997: 393).
A third concern warranted by the corruption discourse relates to its
idealization of the “resisting forces” of corruption – i.e. privatization,
liberalization, and democratization. In general, the policy literature is
characterized by a naive and uncritical acceptance of these Western
initiatives as the key solutions to the problem of corruption regardless of
national circumstances and contexts. One of the key limitations of these
policies, as they have been implemented in a variety of countries, is
their narrowness and consequent inattention to the need for wide-ranging
social and institutional reforms. This exact problem is noted by Kong (1996)
who argues within the Korean context that the international trend towards
liberalization

and democratization

has been largely ineffective in

countering the institutional foundations of corruption in the country. For
him, this reality stems from the narrow framework according to which
these efforts are often conceived, “The evidence from countries where
liberalization is advanced is that it is more a formula for promoting
efficiency in a very narrow sense than a check against corruption. By
contrast, fighting corruption demands effective regulation, the necessary
conditions of which are the existence of a genuine countervailing institutional
and societal power” (Kong, 1996: 55). Often, the result of liberalization and
democratization under these circumstances is the facilitation of corruption.
This has been observed by Tarkowski (1989) in Poland and the USSR, by
Flannery (1998) in the African context, and by White (1996) in the case of
China where he argues that, “Chinese market reforms have created an
environment in which an official has greater freedom to abuse his or her
position, has more motivation to do so and less motivation not to, and has
many wellresourced people willing to join the transaction on terms which

offer security as well as material advantage” (White, 1996: 45). What
becomes clear from these case studies is the inadequacy of imposing
principles of economic and

political

freedom

in

nature,

while

systematically neglecting the unique national characteristics and conditions
which will determine their viability and reasonableness in practice.
The final concern precipitated by the corruption discourse is that while the
policies advocated by the international community are extremely narrow in
breadth, they are in fact very intrusive in terms of their depth. The
international community is seemingly prepared to act with or without the
cooperation or consensus of the countries targeted by anti-corruption
policies. The invasiveness of this approach is reflected in the statement made
by Kaufmann,
The time is ripe for a revolution . . . The World Bank, which is poised
to take concrete action can also deliver technical assistance programs to
help reorganize customs institutions, develop transparent and effective
treasury departments, and spearhead procurement and auditing reforms
within governments . . . Finally, international institutions should take
steps to encourage participatory approaches in these countries in order
to build consensus for anti-corruption drives and associated reforms.
Civil society, wherever it is really present is likely to be a major ally
in resisting corruption.

(Kaufmann, 1997: 130)

As revealed by this framing of the corruption problem, the participation of
targeted countries represents a mere afterthought in anti-corruption
initiatives. Once again, this is evidence of the oversimplification of the
corruption issue as it is conceived within international debates, as well as
the international community’s inattention to local contexts and conditions
as they relate to corrupt practices and behaviours.

Overall, what emerges from this critical review of the policy and research
literature on corruption is the consistency between the framework through
which corruption has been defined, problematized, and remedied, and the
broader interests and demands of the global market system. Thus,
corruption is largely conceived of as an economic distortion which is
believed to require wide-ranging and highly penetrating campaigns of
democratization, privatization, and free market liberalization initiated almost
exclusively by international organizations and agencies, and charted within a
growing context of foreign aid and investment. Interestingly, the framing
of the corruption problem in these terms not only identifies the expansion
of the free market as a key anti-corruption strategy, but also requires and
legitimates foreign

intervention

as

the basis

for the successful

implementation of this policy. Clearly, this entire approach both mirrors
and supports the reigning Western agenda for a free, and multi-lateral
system of global trade and investment.
In light of this apparent homology, it is our belief that greater suspicion
must be raised concerning the assumed status of corruption as a growing
social problem. Supported by an absence of credible evidence that
corruption has actually increased over the past decade, this more critical
stance requires that we suspend this common assumption levied by
researchers and policy makers and take a closer look at the broader
social, political, and economic contexts and conditions within which the
current discourse on corruption has been fashioned. Specifically, the
context that must be critically examined is that of globalization as it is
represented and defined by the same

international agencies and

organizations who have become major players in the corruption debate.
The rationale for this approach is that it is only with the increasing
globalization of capital and investment, and the corresponding demands

for access, transparency, and predictability in financial transactions, that
corruption has emerged as a critical social, political, and most importantly,
economic issue. An initial sense of this primarily economic link between
globalization and corruption is provided by Murphy (1995) who argues
that,
. . . the globalization of trade as evidenced by the formation of the
European Union, the signing of General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT), and, more recently, the ratification of North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), makes the problem of bribery more urgent
today than ever before.

(Murphy, 1995: 388).

Ultimately, what this perspective requires is a return to the anti-corruption
crusaders – the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF – and an analysis of their
broader social, political, and economic mandates as they have evolved within
the context of economic globalization. It is hoped that such an effort will help
to lay bare the underlying nature and dynamics of the global discourse on
corruption.

2. Globalization and the world economy

According to recent policy statements issued by the key players in the
international arena – the OECD, the IMF, and the World Bank – we are
currently in the midst of a series of fundamental and profound changes to
the world economy. Specifically, it is argued that the forces of globalization,
the transformation of political regimes, and the subsequent dismantling of
pre-existing social and economic barriers, have precipitated a movement
towards the globalization of investment, capital, and trade, and thus, the
integration of the world’s economies on a previously unprecedented scale.9

The profundity of these social, political, and economic changes is clearly
articulated by Meny (1996) who notes that,
The doctrine of the market has been endorsed by the economic
achievements of Japan and the new Asian tigers, and reinforced,
conversely, by the collapse of the socialist countries and the growing
difficulties of the social democratic governments in coping with their
costly Keynesianbased policies. Everywhere, under the impetus of
neo-liberals or under the iron rod of the World Bank, or even of
OECD, vigorous policies of deregulation and privatization have
dismantled the state’s legal, economic, and financial control.
Everywhere, new rules of the game have been imposed and new
players have emerged. Old self-interested coalitions have been
challenged under the impact of new ideas and increasingly pressing
external constraints bound up with the formation of new regional blocs
and the liberalization of world trade. (Meny, 1996: 315)10
From the perspective of researchers and policy analysts, this concurrent
movement towards the mobilization of global capital and the progressive
integration of national economics is understood to require a fundamental
shift in the ways in which the economies of the world are managed (OECD,
1997). Specifically, it is argued that future economic growth and prosperity
are dependent upon the establishment of a rules-based multilateral system
according to which global capital is permitted to flow freely across
international boarders on the basis of universally binding rules and legislative
policies. Such a model is said to be necessary in order to both ensure the
growing access of capital to foreign markets, and establish a normative
framework of universally agreed upon rules, policies, and procedures
according to which these capital flows may be governed. The intended
result is not only the expansion of current levels of economic integration,

but also the insurance that this integration will be executed under conditions
of stability and predictability – key components of the market economy.
According to the OECD, IMF, and World Bank, two specific and
fundamental conditions must be met if such a global economy is to
emerge: economic liberalization, and the establishment of a system of
global economic governance.
The first objective, that of economic liberalization, is based on the
principle that future global economic development is dependent upon the
unfettered access of foreign capital to domestic markets. The typical
rationale for this is that these liberalized economic regimes will generate
new opportunities for foreign investment,11 and thus, attract significant
capital flows to developing nations where it may be used to finance social
and economic development. Typically, this scenario is seen to require a
number of fundamental reforms to social, political and economic institutions
– particularly within the context of developing nations – which are designed
to reduce barriers to trade and investment, and to enhance the productive
capacities of nation states. The pursuit of these policies is seen to be integral
to the successful integration of national economies into the global market
system,
Though the speed and sequencing of liberalization will have to be
determined by each country in light of its particular circumstances,
policies should be geared to the ultimate objective of full integration
into the global financial system. To this end, countries will need to set
in place forward-looking programmes for the removal of capital
controls, the liberalization of cross-border financial services and the
abolition of restrictions to market access by foreign investors and
institutions.
(OECD, 1997: 26)

According to the OECD, the accomplishment of such transformations on an
international scale is essential to the maximization of economic growth and
prosperity for both developed and developing nations. This is referred to as
the ‘high performance scenario,’ “The high performance scenario is not a
forecast. It is a realistic possibility for the world economy, if governments
undertake a wide range of necessary policy reforms. These include
moving towards global free trade and capital movements, fiscal
consolidation, structural reform and in the case of a large number of nonOECD economies developing the necessary capacity for development”
(OECD, 1997: 7). The dangers of not fulfilling these strategic
requirements are also made equally clear, “Against that, much worse
scenarios could be envisaged, particularly if governments do not proceed
with reform or do not resist protectionist pressures. A reversal of
globalization could lead down the road of global fragmentation, with adverse
effects for prosperity and political stability” (OECD, 1997: 8).
The corollary of this process of liberalization is the establishment of an
effective system of economic governance through which emerging market
economies may be integrated into the global economic order. The need for
such a scheme stems from the reality that with rapid economic liberalization
has come the emergence of a number of new market economies which are
now open to global capital flows, and yet which lack the institutional and
regulatory frameworks through which these trade and investment flows may
be regulated. This dilemma is noted by Jomo (1998) who argues that, “...
financial liberalization has undermined previously existing governance
institutions and mechanisms without creating adequate alternatives in their
place” (Jomo, 1998: 21). The absence of such an economic and political
infrastructure is problematic to the extent that it allows these economies

to operate independently of the principles and discipline of the market
system, hence elevating their levels of systemic risk and threatening
investor confidence.12 Within the context of ever increasing levels of
economic integration, this situation makes both developing nations, and
thus the world economy as a whole, much more susceptible to fiscal
shocks and instabilities due to the constant threat of capital flight.13
In response to these concerns, organizations such as the OECD, the World
Bank, and the IMF have become increasingly involved in the design and
implementation of a system of economic governance whose primary mandate
is the introduction of greater stability and predictability into the international
economic system, and thus, the minimization of the risk and uncertainty
invariably faced by global capital as it enters into foreign economies
currently outside of the established market system. This general strategy
consists of two key elements. The first is the establishment of stable and
sustainable macroeconomic policies and positions. The necessity of these
types of reforms, which typically include low inflation rates, a strong and
sustainable fiscal position, the absence of large domestic price distortions,
and a sound banking system, is clearly stated in a recent OECD policy
report,
It is quite clear that stable and sustainable macroeconomic policy is
a precondition for taking advantage of the opportunities provided by
globalization, as well as for successful structural reform. This is
particularly true for non-Member countries with a history of
macroeconomic instability. Low inflation rates and sustainable fiscal
positions reduce the riskiness and improve the allocation of savings and
investment, thereby stimulating economic development. They also
allow economies to take advantage of the opportunities offered by
global financial markets.

(OECD, 1997: 23)

While it appears from this account that developing nations are the primary
beneficiaries of these reforms, in reality it is the interests of foreign investors
which are driving the process of macro-economic re-structuring. This more
realistic position is captured in a World Bank report which argues that,
. . . [developing nations] must implement policy reforms and strengthen
institutions to make their markets more attractive to foreign investors
and reduce the risks of capital market instability. While investors are
attracted by the potential for rapid growth and high returns, they are
discouraged by operating inefficiencies, by the lack of reliability of mar-

ket institutions and infrastructure, and by regulatory frameworks that
increase transaction costs and reduce transparency. Improvements that
increase the attractiveness of emerging markets for foreign investors also
serve to reduce volatility and risks.

(World Bank, 1997d: 55)

Thus, the insurance of a stable and predictable investment environment
figures prominently in the attempts to manage emerging markets.
The second key component of this loose framework of economic
governance is the enactment of institutional reforms designed to introduce
greater transparency and accountability into political and economic
institutions. A core mandate of the OECD (OECD, 1997), the IMF
(IMF, 1997; 1998), and the World Bank (World Bank, 1997d), this
transparency is believed to be essential to a stable global economy as it
provides a critical flow of information through which levels of economic
risk may be ascertained, and thus, accurate investment decisions
ultimately rendered. The establishment of an effective system of disclosure
also constitutes an important source of accountability through which

emerging economies are inevitably subjected to the discipline of the global
market. The result is the reduction of systemic risk, the augmentation of
investor confidence, and thus, the insurance of greater economic
development and stability. Thus, it is argued within a recent World Bank
report that,
Constructing and reinforcing the regulatory framework is essential for
emerging markets to attract foreign investors and reduce systemic risk.
Investors are most concerned with protection of property rights
(including minority shareholder rights) and transparency. For example,
investors want both macro data on economic prospects and micro
data on corporate performance, to be able to make informed
investment choices. Improving disclosure will not only address
investor concerns but will also reduce the susceptibility of the market
to volatility resulting from incomplete or asymmetric information.
(World Bank, 1997d: 57)

The establishment of a regulatory system premised upon the principles of
transparency, disclosure, and market discipline is also featured in the recent
policy work of the OECD. However, the emphasis here is placed more
directly on the private sector and its responsibility for what is termed
effective corporate governance,
If countries are to reap the full benefits of the global capital market, and
if they are to attract long-term “patient” capital, corporate governance
arrangements must be credible and well understood across borders.
Adherence to good corporate governance practices will help reinforce
the confidence of investors, may reduce the cost of capital, and
ultimately induce more stable capital flows.

(OECD, 1999: 2)

Once again, it is the provision of information through clear disclosure
practices which is identified as a key element of this strategy, “The
corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate
information is disclosed on all material matters regarding the financial
situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company”
(OECD, 1999: 7).
Overall, what emerges from this review of OECD, IMF, and World Bank
policy statements is a clear drive towards the establishment of a global
economic order premised upon high levels of economic integration, and
thus, growth and prosperity. The pursuit of this global order is understood to
entail two fundamental principles: access and accountability. Thus, we have
an endless number of policy reports issued by each of these organizations
detailing not only the benefits of the liberalization of trade and investment,
but also the establishment of a framework of economic governance through
which these liberated trade and investment flows may be governed in
conjunction with the demands of the global capitalist economy. The
establishment of clear disclosure practices and transparent regulatory
frameworks figures prominently in these efforts. Perhaps the best
expression of this dual strategy is the OECD’s recent pursuit of a multilateral agreement on trade and investment (MAI) whose mandate is both
the liberalization of trade and investment, and the establishment of a rulesbased multi-lateral system which will provide universal guidelines and
protections for financial transactions. The importance of such a strategy is
clearly articulated within an OECD policy report which states that,
Widely-accepted and effective international agreements on trade,
investment, finance and taxation are essential supports for the
multilateral economic system. Internationally-agreed rules of the game
limit the scope for domestic regulations to distort transactions.

Moreover, without such rules, there is a risk that countries might have
recourse to “selective reciprocity” or opportunistically deviate from
internationally-agreed upon principles for short-term advantage
through, for example, trade and in vestment-distorting subsidies,
arbitrary treatment of foreign investors, tax competition between
governments, degradation in labour and environmental standards,
bribery

and

corruption

in

international

trade

and,

more

fundamentally, swings between protection and liberalization.
(OECD, 1997: 23)
Ultimately then, it is clear that the international business community is
currently invested in an effort to both expand the reach of Western nations
into developing economies based on the promise of higher investment
returns and diversified portfolios, and to minimize the systemic risks faced
by these capital flows as they enter foreign markets which have embraced
the logic of the capitalist system while failing to institute the required
institutional and macroeconomic reforms to ensure a stable investment
environment. This framework of global economic relations is highly
instructive as it provides a fundamental context through which the
corruption epidemic must be viewed.

3. Globalization and the risks of corruption

In juxtaposing the discourse of corruption with that of economic
globalization it soon becomes clear that the recent transformations in the
definition of the corruption problem are linked to the perceived shifts in the
organization of the global economy. When viewed in these terms, it may
be argued that corruption is problematic to the extent that it represents a
source of economic risk and uncertainty to foreign investment, and thus,

stands in contradiction to the market requirements of stability, security, and
predictability. It is this very concern which is expressed in a 1996 OECD
Working Report in which it is stated that,
[Corrupt practices] hamper the development of international trade by
distorting competition, raising transaction costs, compromising the
operation of free and open markets, and distorting the allocation of
resources at the internal level. Corruption is a disincentive to
investment: investors shun countries where it is endemic. Finally,
corrupt practices in connection with development assistance cast
discredit on the efforts being made, and provide justification for
drastic cuts in aid budgets in donor countries.

(OECD, 1996: 9)

Similar views have been expressed in both the general policy and academic
literatures where corruption has been identified at various points as a source
of potential risk and uncertainty to the free flow of international capital
(Goudie and Stasavage, 1998; Zedalis, 1998; Almond and Syfert, 1997;
Glynn, Kobrin and Naim, 1997; Rodrick and Rauch, 1997; Elliott, 1997;
Sutton, 1997; Randall, 1997; Murphy, 1995; LeVine, 1989; Rosenthal,
1989). This is what Goudie and Stasavage (1998) term the disincentive
effects of corruption. “In addition to the distortionary impact that reduces
the efficiency of present economic activity, the prevalence of corruption
arguably acts on the economic environment in a far more insidious manner
through the creation of significantly higher levels of risk and uncertainty in
economic transactions” (Goudie and Stasavage, 1998: 143). It is based on
this status as a source of risk and uncertainty that corruption is identified
as a threat to the stability and integrity of the emerging world economy.
This very insight leads Glynn, Kobrin and Naim (1997) to assert that, “As a
growing number of experts are beginning to recognize, widespread
corruption threatens the very basis of an open, multilateral world

economy” (Glynn, Kobrin and Naim, 1997: 13), a danger that is strongly
reiterated by LeVine who as early as 1989 recognized that, “... the new
transnational corruption, once revealed, had to be recognized for what it
was – a new and dangerous challenge to the stability and predictability of
the international market”? (LeVine, 1989; 687).
Thus, while presenting national development and social equality as the
key issues in the corruption debate, it quickly becomes apparent that these
concerns belie a more fundamental and emergent awareness of corruption,
particularly in the form of bribery and rent extraction, as a significant barrier
to the efforts of Western nations to establish a free and efficient global
economic system. Once again, the welfare of developing nations appears as
an afterthought to the welfare and demands of international investors.
Despite the general recognition that corruption represents a barrier to trade
and a source of risk and uncertainty to international investment, and that
this risk has become amplified within the context of globalization, there has
been little effort within the research literature to systematically examine these
effects and their relation to more general developments within the global
economy. Based on the preceding review of the policies of the OECD, IMF,
and World Bank, it can be argued that this general status of corruption as a
source of risk actually embodies three specific elements which undermine or
threaten the objectives of economic globalization. The first is most consistent
with the dominant view of corruption and relates to the status of corrupt
practices as additional and variable costs within financial transactions. This
is what Sutton (1997) refers to as a transactional barrier, “Transactional
barriers play a harmful role in the international market, imposing additional
costs on market actors and discouraging transactions from occurring. By
forcing producers and consumers to pay higher costs in order to engage
in the transaction, corruption functions as a transactional barrier. As such,

corruption imposes additional costs on market actors with the effect of
deterring market exchanges from ever taking place” (Sutton, 1997: 1438). It
is important to note that this status of corruption as a transactional barrier
consists not only of the elevated costs of investments, but also the
uncertainty concerning the amount that must be paid, the payment’s
potential effect on a given transaction, and the added time and expense
involved in negotiating with the recipients of the payment (Sutton, 1997).
These factors have contributed to the finding by one analyst that investing in
a relatively corrupt country, when compared with a less corrupt one, is
equivalent to an additional 20% tax on the investment (Wei in Kaufinann,
1997). Thus, in a very basic sense, corruption constitutes a source of
uncertainty to investors as it imposes not only an additional cost on
financial transactions, but also one that is variable and indeterminate in
nature.
Corruption may also be construed as a source of economic risk and
uncertainty to the extent that it constitutes a potential barrier to the free
movement of trade and global capital flows through domestic markets. This
effect derives from the co-existence of corruption with non-democratic and
non-competitive political and economic regimes which are supported by a
variety of regulative and legislative barriers restricting the accessibility of
foreign capital to domestic markets. In fact, as previously revealed, it is
these closed systems which generate the economic rents upon which
corruption depends. Clearly, these forms of economic protectionism stand
in direct contradiction to the demands of the global market for both
unfettered and highly predictable access to domestic markets. In this
respect, they are indicative of a critical source of economic risk to
foreign investors. From this vantage point, it may be argued that
corruption is problematic, not as a threat to national economic

development and political stability as is commonly believed, but rather as
an indication of non-competitive, and thus risky, market structures which
threaten international investment. In this respect, within the context of
international demands for the liberalization and democratization of
developing economies, corruption stands as a proxy for a much broader
series of economic issues and concerns.
The third element of the corruption-risk equation relates to the status of
corruption as an indication of non-transparent and non-accountable market
processes. This follows from the reality that the restrictive and noncompetitive market conditions typically associated with corrupt regimes
not only constitute barriers to market access for global investors, but also
create conditions in which there is a high degree of secrecy, and a
corresponding lack of information, concerning political and economic
activities. This follows from both the considerable authority, autonomy,
and discretion with which individuals within corrupt regimes are able to
execute their responsibilities, and the systematic absence of independent
regulatory bodies designed to monitor these activities. Ultimately, the
result of these conditions is a serious restriction on the flow of quality
information to foreign investors, and thus, the introduction of a critical
source of unpredictability into the market as investors are deprived of clear
information on which to make investment decisions. This uncertainty
inevitably undermines investor confidence, and thus, engenders market
volatility. The importance of transparency in avoiding such a scenario is
clearly captured by Kopits and Craig (1998) who argue that, “Fiscal
transparency – defined as public openness in government institutions, fiscal
policy intentions, public sector accounts, indicators, and forecasts – is
fundamental to sound economic policy. Transparency allows the market to
evaluate, and impose discipline on, government policy and increases the

political risk of unsustainable policies” (Kopits and Craig, 1998: 13). Once
again, corruption emerges from this discussion as a convenient surrogate for
a broader set of socio-economic interests and concerns. What this suggests
is that corruption is constituted as a source of economic risk within the
discourse of transparency and accountability due largely to its association
with

an

economic

and

political

infrastructure

which

is

non-

communicative, and thus, impervious to the demands of the international
investment community.

It
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the

obscurity
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institutional

environment, rather than corruption in-and-of-itself, which is problematic
from this global perspective.
Ultimately then, what we have is a dual issue. On the one hand, the global
market demands free access to foreign markets. On the other hand, it also
requires that this access be governed according to the recognized principles
of the free market. To the extent that either of these conditions is not met,
the expansion of the global market will be undermined. It is according to
this specific context that corruption has emerged as a critical problem as it
threatens both free market access, and the transparency and governability of
this access once it has been achieved. These links between the liberalization
of economic markets, the required transparency and governability of these
markets, and the status of corruption as a threat to these twin pillars of the
capitalist economy is clearly articulated by Almond and Syfert (1997) who
identify liberalization and governability as two key trends within what they
term the ‘New Global Economy,’
One clear trend [in the New Global Economy] is the movement toward
open markets and free trade. A consensus is emerging among
economists that free trade benefits all who practice it, even though there
remain many who do not. Free trade, its advocates relentlessly drum
home, is best under all circumstances. Another recent trend – slower

to develop, but potentially as powerful – concerns the darker,
sometimes seamy underside of international business. As competition
intensifies and margins shrink, governments and businessmen around
the world are paying closer attention to the risks, costs, and
consequences of bribery, graft, and other forms of corruption in
international business. It is increasingly clear that these two trends are
interrelated and interdependent. A truly open, free, and competitive
world marketplace requires a trading system characterized by honesty,
transparency, and fair dealing.
(Almond and Syfert, 1997: 391)

These same authors ultimately conclude from this characterization of the
global economy that, “Corruption is fundamentally incompatible with
international competitiveness; it distorts proper functioning of the market
and drains confidence in a worldwide economic system dependent on
tough, but fair competition” (Almond and Syfert, 1997: 403). Clearly what
this suggests

is that corruption has become largely defined and

problematized in economic terms, and that this economic framework is
both linked to the broader processes of economic globalization and exists
independently of any substantive changes in absolute levels of corruption.

4. Anti-corruption legislation

Beyond general statements issued by international organizations, policy
makers, and academics concerning the status of corruption as both a source of
economic risk and a barrier to free trade, another important and informative
component of the discourse on corruption relates to the debates surrounding

proposed anti-corruption legislation, particularly within the context of the
OECD.14 Framed explicitly as a “supply-side” approach to the corruption
problem, the culmination of the OECD anti-corruption campaign came in
December of 1997 with the signing of the OECD Paris Agreement.
Consisting of commitments by member countries to establish national
legislation criminalizing the payment of bribes by national corporations to
foreign governments, this agreement represents one of the strongest
unilateral indictments of transnational bribery, and is indicative of at least
a symbolic commitment on the part of a number of different nations to
combat the perceived corruption problem through the regulation of their own
multinationals. The OECD Convention has since entered into force (Feb. 15,
1999) based on the submission of instruments of ratification by countries
making up 60% of OECD exports. This included Canada, Japan,
Germany, France, and the United States. As of Jan. 31, 2000, the required
national legislation has been passed in twenty out of the thirty-four
signatories.
The OECD Agreement is informative to the extent that it frames the need
for anti-bribery legislation in terms of general concerns relating to
globalization and the existence of corruption as a threat to the transparency,
efficiency, and stability of the global market system, hence echoing the
more general policy orientation of the organization. However, perhaps more
revealing is the legislation’s foundation in an effort on the part of the U.S.
to multilateralize its own anti-corruption legislation: the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) (Klich, 1996; Roberts, 1989; Heidenheimer, 1996).
Initially passed in 1977 as a reaction to a series of political and economic
corruption scandals, the FCPA was the first legislation in the world to
restrict the ability of domestic corporations to practice bribery in foreign
nations. Since its passage, the FCPA has received a considerable amount of

scrutiny given the contention by U.S. business interests that it undermines
the competitive position of American corporations operating abroad.
Specifically, it has been argued that American business interests are placed
at a distinct disadvantage in relation to foreign corporations which are
allowed to offer bribes in return for the procurement of lucrative contracts.
Losses from this anti-competitiveness of the FCPA have been reported to
be as high as $36 billion.15
Based on this historical context, the U.S. efforts to introduce
internationally binding restrictions against transnational bribery through the
OECD may be viewed as part of an explicit strategy to level the economic
playing field in response to the perceived restrictions of the FCPA
(Mahaney, 1981; Roberts, 1989; Murphy, 1995; Klich, 1996; Muffler,
1995). In fact, a key provision of the 1988 Trade Act, which included
various reforms to the FCPA, included a request that the President pursue
the multilateralization of the FCPA within the context of the OECD
(Roberts, 1989). This call for multilateralization has been echoed on a
number of policy and academic fronts (Muffler, 1995).
Overall, there are a number of insights which follow from this relationship
between the FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. First, corruption
is approached primarily from the perspective of trade. In other words, the
OECD initiative grew out of perceived inequalities in trade relations rather
than any true concern with the implications of corruption for national
development and economic efficiency – the most commonly cited motives
for the fight against corruption. Despite the narrowness of this initial
impetus, the rationale for the anti-corruption legislation has since been
expanded to include more general concerns with economic efficiency and
equal access to trade markets, hence both legitimating the Agreement as a
policy that is good for all nations, and extending the economic approach to

corruption.
Secondly, the OECD legislation highlights the role of subjective
perceptions and opinions in the corruption debate. Almost all of the
available evidence indicates that the FCPA does not constitute a
significant threat to the competitiveness of U.S. corporations. First is the
issue of actual economic effects. In this respect, a number of recent
studies have found little evidence that the FCPA has had a major impact
on U.S. exports and investments abroad (Almond and Syfert, 1997;
Elliott, 1997, Klich, 1996). As Klich (1996) concludes, “Despite some
recent reports, it is not at all clear that American companies are losing
substantial investment opportunities because of the FCPA” (Klich: 141).
Secondly, a number of authors have both identified ambiguities within the
legislation which make it very difficult to enforce (Rosenthal, 1989;
Meny, 1996), and noted the disinclination of the
U.S. government to pursue actual charges and convictions (Froot, 1998;
Randall, 1997).16 Perhaps the best articulation of the problematic nature of
the legislation is provided by Meny (1996) who argues that, “The
effectiveness of this policy is nevertheless doubtful, owing to the many
different possibilities of evasion and the difficulty of providing proof of these
illegal practices. The official renumeration of ‘brokers’ or the use of local
subcontracted companies to carry out the ‘dirty job’ are among the
objectives sought without committing a statutory offence” (Meny, 1996:
317). Overall, the suggestion here is that anti-corruption legislation, like
the corruption “problem” itself, is more perceived than real.
Finally, the OECD legislation is an expression of existing inequalities in
economic power and influence – inequalities which may be seen to underlie
the corruption discourse as a whole. Thus, while the fight against corruption is
presented as a disinterested process designed to benefit the global economy

as a whole, it is clear from this review that these initiatives are conceived
and orchestrated by particular nations, in this case the United States, who
are attempting to further their own economic and foreign policies under the
legitimating guise of international legislation.

5. Discussion: The economics of corruption and its control

Taken as a whole, this discussion of the links between recent anti-corruption
initiatives and global economic strategies suggests that the discourse of
corruption must be understood within the context of economic globalization
and the management of international capital flows. More specifically, this
discourse emerges as part of a broader strategy of global economic,
political, and social governance articulated through organizations such as
the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF. The links between corruption
discourses and the forces of global economic governance have been
revealed to take two primary forms. First, it is clear that, to a large
extent, anti-corruption platforms have been inspired by the perceived threat
posed by corrupt practices to international trade and investment flows. From
this vantage point, international policies designed to restrict these practices
may be interpreted as part of a broader effort to manage investment risk
and ensure the stability and security of international trade. The existence
of corruption as a transactional barrier, and hence, an investment threat is
captured by Sutton (1997) who argues that, “The uncertainty that
producers face regarding the amount they must pay and the payment’s
potential effect on a given transaction, the added time and expense
producers face in negotiating with the recipients of the payment, and the
expenditure of an otherwise-unnecessary payment are all additional
transaction costs which act as barriers to any investment” (Sutton, 1997:

1439). Ultimately then, it becomes clear that corruption has emerged as a
source of international concern due to its negative implications for
international trade and investment (Almond and Syfert, 1997: 392) Once
again, the well-being of developing nations emerges as a secondary concern
within this global discourse.
Secondly, based on the wisdom that the elimination of non-competitive
market conditions, reductions in the size of government, and the introduction
of greater visibility and accountability into social and political institutions
represent the optimal policy responses to corrupt practices, it may be argued
that the discourse of corruption emerges as a central element in the
legitimation of the Western agendas of liberalization and democratization –
policies which, in reality, have been revealed to increase corrupt behaviours
and social inequalities. The explicit link between anti-corruption initiatives
and Western political interests is revealed in the recent decision by
organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF to make their loans
contingent upon the reduction of corruption levels – usually through the
fulfillment of directives such as privatization and market liberalization.
This corruption-contingent status of loans is explicitly disclosed in a 1997
World Bank press release which makes reference to the new IMF policy,
The International Monetary Fund, in new guidelines released in
August, has warned its member countries that financial assistance may
be withheld or suspended if government corruption is preventing their
economies from moving out of trouble. The guidelines specifically
mention as causes for corruption the diversion of public funds
through misappropriation, involvement of public officials in tax or
customs fraud, the misuse of foreign exchange reserves, and abuses of
power by bank supervisors, as well as corrupt practices in regulating
foreign direct investment.

(World Bank, 1997c: 1)

This strategy is particularly significant within the context of the Asian
economic crisis where bailout packages, sponsored by the U.S. dominated
IMF, were made contingent upon the satisfactory implementation of
economic reforms which, in the long run, may be seen to favour Western
business and political interests. Given the identification of corruption as a
key factor in the collapse of various Asian economies, transparency,
accountability, and democratization emerged as important elements of
IMF-sponsored reform efforts in countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, and
Korea (IMF, 1997). This emphasis upon transparency and accountability in
the surveillance efforts of the IMF following the Asian crisis are clearly
revealed in a recent IMF report,
The IMF’s work on surveillance issues intensified following the
outbreak and spread of the financial crisis to other Asian economies
and the subsequent pressures on other emerging market economies.
Surveillance was also intensified in recognition that promoting good
governance, making budgets more transparent, improving data
collection and disclosure, and strengthening financial sectors are
increasingly important if countries are to establish and maintain
private sector confidence and lay the groundwork for sustained growth.
(IMF, 1998: 2)

Ultimately then, it appears that anti-corruption strategies once again emerge
as valuable foils for the promotion of specific strategies of democratization,
liberalization, and economic reform (trade and investment liberalization)
which, in turn, are supportive of powerful economic and political interests. In
the Asian case, anti-corruption initiatives have provided a key opportunity for
the penetration of U.S. business interests into the once lucrative Asian market,

primarily through the growing influence and mandates of the World Bank
and IMF and their ability to enforce macroeconomic reform through loan
conditionalities. The intersection of these underlying economic and political
interests is clearly expressed by Jomo (1998) in reference to the Korean
context, “Almost in tandem with financial liberalization, IMF intervention is
generally recognized to undermine and limit national economic sovereignty.
Particularly damning is the clear abuse of imposed IMF conditionalities in
the Korean aid package to resolve outstanding bilateral issues in favour of
the US and Japanese interests. Legislation and other new regulation enabling
greater foreign ownership of as well as increased market access to the Korean
economy – which have little to do with the crisis or its immediate causes –
have been forced upon the Korean government” (Jomo, 1998: 21).

Conclusion

In summary, it appears from the above analysis that the discourse of
corruption has emerged as a crucial medium for the articulation and
promotion of global economic and political strategies designed to increase
the flow of global capital through both the management of potential risks,
of which corruption is one, and the reduction of trade barriers. Given the
links between these strategies and the broader processes of democratization
and liberalization, it becomes apparent that anti-corruption strategies must
be understood within the context of global relations of ruling and the efforts
made by particular nations to govern the world economy in the interest of
promoting specific national economic and political objectives. In this
respect, the discourse of corruption may be seen to contribute to the
production, re-production, and legitimation of an ethic of globalization
which itself represents an important form of domination and control. This

very point is made by Silbey (1997) who relates globalization to what she
terms ‘postmodern colonialism,’ “I regard globalization as a form of
postmodern colonialism where the worldwide distribution and consumption
of cultural products removed from the contexts of their production and
interpretation is organized through legal devices to constitute a form of
domination” (219). As she goes on to argue, the principle of the free market
is essential to this vision of globalization, “Globalization, or what I am
calling postmodern colonialism, is an achievement of advanced capitalism
and technological innovation seeking a world free from restraints on the
opportunity to invent and invest” (219). The extent to which this vision of
globalization – as a form of both liberalization and control – is
simultaneously endorsed and promoted by organizations such as the OECD,
the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization is clearly
revealed in a 1997 OECD policy statement on the “New Global Age,”
In the rapidly changing and globalizing world economy, there will be an
even greater need for international co-operation so as to realize a “New
Global Age,” and the role of the multilateral system will become even
more important. There is a growing internationalization of many policy
issues, which were previously more domestic in nature. And countries
are increasingly confronted with a common set of policy problems, on
which common solutions through identification of best practices and
multilateral surveillance can be effective. In this context, the whole range
of international institutions – from the UN system and the WTO, to the
IMF and the multilateral development banks, and to the many regional
groupings – is now working to develop policies that promote economic
prosperity, political security (including through enhanced economic
interdependence) and sustainable development – policies that would help
realize a “New Global Age.”

(OECD, 1997: 36)

Overall, what this discussion suggests is that the issue of corruption must
be approached through a critical framework which is cognizant of the broader
contexts and conditions according to which the corruption debate has been
fashioned, and the interests which it acts to support. The development of such
a critical position bears consequences not only for the treatment of corruption
as a social issue, but also for more general questions concerning globalization
and its implications for governance, crime, and social control. Specifically,
there is a growing need for criminology to come to terms with the existence
of globalization as a new conceptual and empirical space which is being used
to promote and legitimate a fundamental re-thinking of the social order as it
is conceived on a global scale. This speaks to the observation by Tita that, “It
is a fact that globalization has created a new political and economic space,
against which the existing established powers have not yet perfected an
adequate response” (Tita, 1998: 48). Based on the foregoing analysis, it
appears that this order is increasingly being articulated according to an
exclusively economic logic through a series of organizational and
institutional intermediaries which transcend the traditional boundaries of the
nation-state.17 In this respect, the problematization of corruption is
significant to the extent that it provides a critical perspective on this
emerging order, and thus, a point from which criminology, and social theory
more generally, may begin to assess the nature and significance of
globalization’s new space.

Notes
1. According to one estimate, corruption has existed worldwide in multiple forms from
approximately 3000 B.C. to the present day (Noonan, 1984 in Sutton, 1997).
2. Both the IMF and World Bank have recently introduced reforms to their lending practices
making the provision of funds conditional upon the successful implementation of a
variety of macroeconomic and anti-corruption reforms. This use of conditionalities to
effect desired structural changes in domestic economies has been met with severe
criticism from a variety of national leaders as yet another form of Western imperialism.
3. The most common definition of corruption applied within the policy and academic
literature is, “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 1997a: 8) with this
abuse understood primarily in terms of the offering and acceptance of bribes by public
officials. According to the World Bank, “Public office is abused for private gain when
an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents
actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive
advantage” (World Bank, 1997a: 8).
4. Of the leading researchers on corruption, two are members of international development
organizations. This includes Paulo Mauro, an economist in the IMF’s European I
Department, and Daniel Kaufmann, a lead economist in the World Bank’s
Development Research Group.
5. Both competitive pressures operating on the initial agreement, and the possible
requirement of future payments make corruption a variable economic cost faced by
investors.
6. It must be noted that the evidence for this increase is primarily anecdotal and subjective
in nature. Typically, it is based on corruption indexes published by organizations such
as Transparency International which ask respondents, primarily from the field of
business, to provide ratings of the perceived level of corruption within a number of
different countries. Critics have responded to this methodology by noting that it is
virtually impossible to establish accurate, objective measures of corruption (RoseAckerman, 1997; Meny, 1996). Thus, Susan Rose-Ackerman (1997) has argued that,
“Reliable data on the magnitude of corruption across countries does not exist and
probably cannot exist in principle” (Rose-Ackerman, 1997: 31). Meny (1996) comes
to a similar conclusion, “. . . the real or assumed extent of corruption is as much a matter
of perception and feeling as a mathematical measurement of the phenomenon” (Meny,
1996: 310). Nevertheless, even the recognition of these data limitations has not
prevented some key commentators from claiming significant increases in corruption
levels, “However incomplete, data from developing and postsocialist countries confirm
the widespread impression that corrupt practices are increasing” (Leiken, 1997: 61).
7. Once again, methodological barriers to the accurate measurement of corruption levels
draws into serious question the validity of these types of studies – all of which rely on
subjective corruption indices provided by organizations such as Transparency
International.
8. Additional sources of economic rents include: trade restrictions, government subsidies,
price controls, multiple exchange rate systems and foreign exchange allocation schemes,
and low wages in civil service.
9. Indices of this economic integration include the greater contribution of non-OECD
countries to world Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and significant increases in the
ratio of trade to GDP and higher levels of Foreign Direct Investment in developing
economies (OECD, 1997: 15–16).
10. As the recent economic crises in Asia, Latin America, and the Soviet Union have revealed,
these developments have not been without their costs. In each of these cases,
advancements in economic integration figured prominently in the economic collapse as
domestic economies became increasingly dependent upon foreign investments, and thus,
subject to the vicissitudes of the market and the possibility of capital flight.
11. World Bank officials suggest that, there are two forces driving investor interest in
developing countries: the search for higher returns, and opportunities for risk
diversification (World Bank, 1997d). The demand for new investment opportunities is
particularly acute given the growing number and strength of institutional investors (i.e.
mutual funds, and pension funds) who are in search of diversified investment portfolios.
12. World Bank officials suggest that investor confidence is linked to three main
considerations, “Investors are concerned with the unreliability of emerging markets in
three main areas: market infrastructure (where the consequences include high
transaction costs, frequent delays in settlement, and outright failed trades); protection of
property rights, in particular those of minority shareholders; and disclosure of market and
company information and control of abusive market practices” (World Bank, 1997d: 6).

13. This type of effect figured prominently in the recent Asian financial crisis.
14. Similar anti-bribery initiatives have been undertaken by the Organization of American
States (OAS) with its Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the United Nations,
the European Union, and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
15. This figure is based on a 1995 classified CIA report, and represents an estimate of the
value of the contracts lost during that year by U.S. companies to foreign competitors who
were not bound by anti-bribery legislation. In his comments on these reported losses,
Klich notes that they are largely based on anecdotal evidence, and thus, do not
constitute conclusive evidence of the deleterious effects of the FCPA. This leads him
to the conclusion that, “Overall, studies of the FCPA’s impact on the competitiveness
of U.S. companies has been inconclusive, frequently reaching inconsistent
conclusions. Given such discrepancies, one cannot unequivocally conclude that the loss
of business because of the FCPA is material and one cannot assess just how significant
that loss is in the grand scale of U.S. investment overseas” (Klich, 1996: 141).
16. According to Randall (1997), between the period of 1977–1988 the Department of Justice
initiated only 20 anti-bribery cases under the FCPA, while the Securities Commission
launched only three.
17. Here an interesting parallel is revealed with the work of theorists in the governmentality
tradition such as Rose and Miller (1992). Among the various transformations in social
control noted by these authors in what they refer to as neo-liberal society, the most
significant from our point of view is the shift away from the State as a primary site
of governance and control towards a series of intermediary institutions, as well as the
growing articulation of social control according to a purely economic and actuarial logic.
We believe this to be entirely consistent with both the growing influence of organizations
such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD in the global social order, and the
organization of this order in conjunction with the principles of economic liberalization
and the minimization of financial risk and uncertainty. The governmentality tradition thus
emerges as a theoretical complement to our primarily substantive analysis.
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